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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Introduction.  –  Today’s  fascination with television makes  us wonder whether  it  might  not  represent  an
authority  capable of leading  people in  a television  studio  to inflict  cruel acts on others,  even  though  they
condemn  those acts.
Objective.  – The  experiment  reported here allows  us to answer  this  question in  the affirmative.  Therefore,
we  transposed Milgram’s  famous experimental  obedience  paradigm  to the context of a  “real” TV  game
show, in  the studio  of  a  large television  production  company, with a  live  audience  and no prizes.
Method.  –  We  set  up several  experimental conditions  designed to tell  us if, in  such contexts,  obedience
was  the dominant  response,  as it is in  the often-replicated  classic  situation.  We  also wished  to know  if
the  introduction of  variations  would reduce obedience.
Results.  –  The  results  show that  obedience  to the host  is the dominant  response, as it is in  Milgram’s  classic
situation.  However,  variations  that  are  assumed  to  reduce this obedience do  not in  fact  demonstrate the
expected effects. An additional experimental condition  appears to  demonstrate that a  determining  factor
of obedience  is the  physical  proximity  of  the host  incarnating the televisual  power.
Conclusion.  – We offer  a  conclusion addressing the societal  aspects  of  obedience.







r é  s  u m  é
Introduction.  –  Vu  la  fascination  qu’exerce  aujourd’hui la télévision, on  se demande  si elle  ne  représente
pas une  autorité  susceptible  de  conduire  les  gens à commettre,  sur un  plateau  de  télévision, des actes
cruels à l’égard  d’autrui, actes que pourtant  ils  réprouvent.
Objectifs.  – La présente  expérience  nous  permet  de  répondre  affirmativement à  cette question.  Pour le
démontrer,  nous  avons transposé  le célèbre  paradigme d’obéissance  de  Milgram dans  le contexte  d’un
jeu  télévisé,  filmé  dans  le  studio d’une entreprise de  production  d’émissions  télévisées,  impliquant  un
public mais pas de  gains.
Méthode.  –  Nous  avons réalisé  plusieurs  conditions  expérimentales  destinées à  faire  apparaître si, dans
un tel  contexte,  l’obéissance  restait, comme dans la situation  classique  souvent  reproduite,  la  réponse
dominante.  Nous souhaitions  aussi savoir  si  l’introduction  de  variantes  permettrait  d’obtenir,  une  réduc-
tion  de  l’obéissance.
Résultats.  –  Les résultats montrent  que l’obéissance à l’animatrice  est, comme dans la situation  standard
de  Milgram,  la réponse  dominante  et que des variantes  supposées  a  priori  réduire cette obéissance  ne  la
réduisent  pas.  Une  condition  expérimentale additionnelle semble indiquer  qu’un facteur déterminant de
l’obéissance  est la proximité  physique  de  l’animatrice  représentant  le  pouvoir télévisuel.
Conclusion.  – On conclut en  évoquant  les aspects  sociétaux de  l’obéissance.
©  2012 Publié  par  Elsevier Masson  SAS.
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Though the effects of television on  viewers are complex and
sometimes difficult to demonstrate experimentally (McGuire,
1986), there is a large body of research indicating the significant
impact of television on people’s behavior (Berkowitz, 1986; Bryant
and Oliver, 2009). Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there are few
studies which demonstrate the authority or prescriptive power
held by the television world and its representatives. Yet, is not
televisual authority at work and particularly striking in game
shows during which, based on a single order given by the game
host, contestants perform violent acts against others or against
themselves? We  wanted to find out whether, at the present time,
television is able to endow certain agents — such as  TV show
hosts — with a degree of authority that gives them the power
to make game-show contestants commit dangerous acts or acts
they condemn. To demonstrate this, we transposed Milgram’s
obedience-to-authority paradigm (Milgram, 1963, 1974) to a  TV
game show setting where a female host (an accomplice of the
experimenters) asked people to deliver (fake) electric shocks to
other persons1.  Our study, then, is not just another replication
of Milgram’s laboratory experiments to  be added to the list, the
difference being that in the Milgram replications, it was  the status
of scientific researcher that granted legitimacy to the agent of
authority (Blass, 2009). In the transposed version reported here,
although we stayed as  close as  possible to Milgram’s obedience
paradigm and electric-shock procedure, our experiment takes
place in a totally different social context, one where the authority
derives its legitimacy from another entity, the television show.
From the subjects’ standpoint, the experiment was not a  scientific
study but a game show taking place in front of a live audience. Our
goal was to see whether and  when people would comply with, or
resist, the televisual authority incarnated by  the host of the game.
1. Theoretical background
In 1963 — in one of the most famous studies in psycho-
logy — Stanley Milgram (1963) showed that ordinary Americans
participating in an experiment on  how punishment affects mem-
ory agreed to satisfy the request of a  researcher — an agent of
authority who urged them to continue with the  experiment — by
acting as a “professor” and delivering dangerous electric shocks
(that were in fact fictitious) to a “student”. Nearly 50 years later,
this research continues to generate new analyses, commentaries
and reinterpretations (De Vos, 2010; Reicher and Haslam, 2011;
Russell, 2011). Although certain situations did indeed produce
disobedience (in particular, the absence of the researcher), the
most striking thing for everyone — especially Milgram — was the
obedience rate obtained, already in 1963. In that study, 62.5%
of the “professors” went all the way up to 450 volts. Given the
spectacular nature of both the situation and the findings, Milgram’s
experiment was reproduced on  more than 3000 persons, recruited
from 12 different countries, and every time, the same results were
obtained (Blass, 1999). Meanwhile, many objections were raised
condemning the experiment (see Miller, 1986). This is why Burger
(2009) recently suggested that during replications of Milgram’s
experiment, subjects should not be asked to send shocks above 150
volts. Indeed, as Packer (2008) points out, this voltage represents
a critical juncture in the  course of the experiment. In addition, the
rate of disobedience cannot be explained by the student’s growing
cries and supposed suffering, which follow the voltage increase.
1 This research was approved by the French Society of Information Science and
Communication Science (SFSIC). It  was considered that the research met the ethical
standards of research on humans, including informed consent. For more information
on  developments concerning the ethical aspects of this experiment, see Oberlé et al.
(2011).
The various reproductions always took place in the same context
(the one designed by Milgram): a scientific study conducted in a
laboratory, with the agent of authority drawing his legitimacy from
his status as a  research scientist. There is one exception, however.
In their fascinating study, Meeus and Raaijmakers (1986, 1987)
transposed the Milgram paradigm to an organizational setting in
which the suffering inflicted by  the experimental subjects was  not
physical but psychological. Subjects had to obey an  alleged head of
personnel’s order to disturb an  applicant during a job  interview. The
obedience rate in this organizational setting almost hit the 100%
mark. However, although their reproduction retained Milgram’s
basic framework, it  did not re-use the electric-shock procedure. In
the transposition we present here, we  stayed as close as possible to
Milgram’s obedience paradigm and electric-shock procedure, but
we inserted it  in television show setting, similar to the way Haslam
and Reicher (2006) transposed Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experi-
ment to the BBC. To do  so,  and contrary to Burger’s (2009) sugges-
tion, we  performed an  identical replication of the  complete electric
shock procedure (up to 460 volts). Burger’s main reason for limiting
the voltage strength is an  ethical one: surpassing 150 volts imposes
too  much suffering and thus too much guilt on obedient subjects.
We  believe that this ethical standard is more comfortable than rig-
orous. It is the very willingness to harm a fellow human being which
is immoral, regardless of the degree of suffering being inflicted.
Moreover, for credibility reasons, transposing the experiment into
a  televised game setting requires the use of violence equivalent to
that frequently implemented in some of these games.
We thus wondered what would happen if  the agent of authority
drew her legitimacy solely from her association with the world
of television. Given the importance of television in our society, it
seems both legitimate and necessary to raise this question.
Our assumption is that the authority is incarnated by  the
game host. While the persuasive influence of hosts is now widely
recognized (Nabi and Hendriks, 2003),  it is the host’s prescriptive
power which we  would like to make apparent and whose potential
limits we  would like to test. This power is related to the statutory
position occupied in an organizational structure and results from
a delegation of power (Coenen-Huther, 2005). It thus does not
depend on  the delegated person’s level of prestige. In fact, the
prestige of the hosts, which depends on their relative popularity,
primarily relates to their leadership capacities. Moreover, in Mil-
gram’s case, when the notion of prestige is mentioned, it relates to
science as a whole, and not to the  scientist giving orders. Similarly,
we can consider the host to be the recipient of a power delegation
from the  televisual authority.
Thus, based on our  assumption that authority is incarnated by
the game host, we  set up three experimental conditions designed to
tell  us when people would obey the televisual authority and when
they would resist it. We  wanted to know whether, in this context,
obedience would remain the  dominant response, as in the clas-
sic situation; and whether introducing a  variation which reduces
obedience in the classic situation (social support for disobedience)
would have the same effect in a televisual context. Finally, a specific
condition was  introduced for the televisual context (see section 2.3
[Experimental subjects and experimental conditions]).
2. Method
2.1. Experimental setting
The experiment took place in a television studio. An original
game show was  set up on stage with the help of technical devices
(cameras, lighting, giant screen, control room, etc.) and human
resources (81 persons) from several companies specializing in the
production of game shows on French TV.  As such shows, there was
Author's personal copy
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a live audience in the seating areas around the stage. The audience
consisted of about 100 persons of all ages who had answered a
short ad on the Internet posted by  a company specializing in the
recruitment of game-show audiences. In  order to account for any
obedience observed, we had to eliminate all causes other than pure
obedience to authority, such as the desire to win money. So  that no
rewards would be at stake, we set up a pilot show in which the par-
ticipants were filmed in “real conditions” but told that the purpose
was to test the game and improve it  if  necessary.
2.2. Experimental requirements
Our transposition to the television setting had to satisfy two
requirements. The first consisted of staying as close as possible
to Milgram’s experimental situation while putting the subjects
in a credible televisual context. Following a discussion with
television producers and filmmakers, we decided that a game
show reproducing Milgram’s situation (a naive questioner is asked
by a TV show host to deliver electric shocks) would meet these
requirements if we could eliminate the motivation to participate
in order to win money. Our next step was to test the credibility
of  the game show on  the producers and TV channel (France 2)
that had agreed to fund the  experiment and incorporate it into
a documentary on the risks of certain reality TV games. To  be
credible, the experiment had to be conducted in a real television
studio, and real television staff had to be trained to work in their
usual way, while nevertheless meeting the rigorous requirements
of  a scientific experiment. This meant not changing the scenario
once it was adopted, replying to questions using the exact material
found in the scenario, and so on. The scenario was pre-tested
on a few technicians from the filming staff and then on the first
questioner in each experimental condition. It worked perfectly.
The second requirement was to make sure that the rapport
between the agent of authority and the agent subjected to that
authority was very close to the one created by Milgram. To verify
this, we established a list of 15 criteria for analyzing situations
of power involving an  asymmetrical relationship between two
persons, one who makes behavioral prescriptions and the other
who is supposed to obey (Table 1). The two situations (our game
show and Milgram’s scientific laboratory) turned out to be very
close for all 15 criteria2.
These precautions allowed us  to conclude that the televisual
framing of Milgram’s paradigm in no way modified the basics, the
type of relationship between the person giving the instructions
and the person receiving them, and thus that in power-based
and situation-based terms, the host-questioner rapport in the
present study was very close to the  researcher-professor situation
in Milgram’s study.
2.3. Experimental subjects and experimental conditions
Seventy-six ordinary people were selected from a consumer
database by an independent company that conducts opinion
polls and market studies. They each received 40 euros. Subjects
who had already participated in a game show were not eligible,
2 The great similarity between the two  situations (15 of  15 common traits) is
not a triviality due to an eventual bias driven by our analysis grid (e.g.  lack of
sensitivity). To demonstrate this, we mentioned two other power relationships in
Table 1: the Foreman/Worker relationship and the Social Worker/Socially Disad-
vantaged Person relationship. It  appears that the researcher/teacher relationship
and the host/questioner relationship share only six traits (out of 15) with the Fore-
man/Worker relationship and seven traits (out of 15) with the Social Worker/Socially
Disadvantaged Person relationship. It is indeed because they are  very similar in the
area of possible power relationships that the relationships implemented in Mil-
gram’s  and our experiments share the same traits.
nor  were persons who  had health problems or were taking any
kind of medication. The experimental population was  from the
Parisian area. The characteristics of the sample are  given in
Tables 2 and 3. The televisual context of the experiment (renting
a studio, hiring technicians, the host’s schedule, etc.) restricted us
to a  predetermined number of days for the  experiment, and thus
a predetermined number of subjects were asked to participate
(80). Four subjects had to be eliminated because they were already
familiar with Milgram’s research.
The experimental subjects were assigned to one of the following
conditions3.
2.3.1. Standard condition (n =  32)
This condition was  similar to Milgram’s “voice-feedback”
condition (Milgram, 1974, Experiment 2). A “questioner” (the
experimental subject) asked 27 questions to a “contestant” (an
accomplice of the experimenter) who could be heard but not seen.
Every time the contestant gave an incorrect answer (according to
a predetermined schedule of 24 incorrect answers out of 27), the
questioner was to penalize him by delivering an  (alleged) electric
shock. The shocks ranged between 20 and 460 volts, and were to
be increased by 20 volts with each new mistake. The game host
had five prods at her disposal for encouraging reluctant subjects to
continue: four were similar to the  ones used by Milgram, and the
fifth was  specific to the TV-show setting (asking the  audience to
intervene).
2.3.2. Social-support condition (n = 19)
This condition was the same as the standard condition, except
that when the voltage reached 120, the production assistant (an
accomplice) rushed out on stage and asked that the game be
stopped because it was too immoral. The assistant was brushed
aside by the host, who  went on with the game.
2.3.3. TV-broadcast condition (n = 18)
This condition was the same as the standard condition, except
that upon arrival, the questioner and alleged contestant were told
that the TV  station would broadcast the pilot show. The players
would be on TV but would still not win any money.
Immediate observation of the set, even before statistical data
analysis, showed that the social support condition, which was  sup-
posed to produce disobedience, was not producing the expected
effect. This observation led us to introduce a new condition, not
included in the  original design, which we tested on the remaining
subjects.
2.3.4. Host-withdrawal condition (n =  7)
This condition was  similar to Milgram’s condition in which
the researcher leaves the experiment (“experimenter absence”,
Milgram, 1974,  Experiment 7). Upon reaching 80 volts, the host
explained that from now on, the players would continue on their
own. Then the host  went off stage and did not come back until the
game was over.
All four conditions will be taken into account in the discussions
which follow, though the  small number of subjects in the fourth
condition warrants some caution.
2.4. Procedure
An alleged producer received each participant along with
another person who was in fact a male accomplice of the
experimenter. The producer told them that they would be filmed
3 Informed consent was obtained from the subjects after they were told that the
game involved delivering electric shocks.
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Table 1
Comparison of the power structure in Milgram’s experiment and in the TV game show, according to the 15 criteria for analyzing situations of power.
Comparaison de la structure du pouvoir dans l’expérience de Milgram et  dans le jeu TV, selon 15  critères d’analyse des situations de  pouvoir.
Criterion for analyzing situations of power Milgram’s
experiment







1. Insertion in a dependence structure: there
exists a formal structure where A  and B
occupy asymmetrical positions
No  No Same situation Yes  Yes
2.  Prescription of obligations (“Do!”): A  is
authorized to  make B do something that B
would not willingly do otherwise
Yes Yes Same situation Yes  Yes
3.  Prescription of prohibitions (“Do not!”): A is
authorized to  prevent B from doing
something that B would like to do
No No Same situation Yes  Yes
4.  Formal evaluation of B by A: the evaluation
must have other consequences on the
evaluated person than interpersonal ones
(e.g. some other person who  will be
informed of the evaluation will “have the
right” to make decisions about B)
No No Same situation Yes  Yes
5.  There exist possibilities for positive
reinforcement that A can use to B’s benefit
No  No Same situation Yes  Yes
6.  There exist possibilities for negative
reinforcement that A can use to B’s detriment
No No Same situation Yes  Yes
7.  Operatory interdependence: what B does
depends on what A does, but also, what A
does depends on what B does
Yes Yes Same situation Yes  Yes
8.  Existence of relatively well-acknowledged
values assumed to justify the situation of
dependence: these values must be general
enough to be transitive with respect some
other, even-more-general value
Yes, science Yes, the game show Same situation Yes  Yes
9.  Extent of dependence: A’s authority can be
brought to bear to affect B’s behaviors or
thoughts elsewhere than in the
interdependence situation defined for the
B-on-A dependence situation (e.g. for
controlling B’s private life, dress habits,
language)
No No Same situation No Yes
10.  Specific material or psychological benefits
of  the interaction situation common to both
persons: these benefits must be shared,
known, and nameable (more than the mere
interest or desire to  participate)
No No Same situation Yes  No
11.  Specific material or psychological costs of
the  interaction situation common to both
persons
No No Same situation Yes  No
12.  B can make a formal appeal (on his/her
own, or by appealing to the opposition) in
case  of misuse of power
Yes, legal recourse Yes, legal recourse Same situation Yes  Yes
13.  Social backing: behind the delegation of
power to A, there is social backing (religious,
political, economic, etc.) accepted by B  and
by a large part of the population; A’s power





Same situation Yes  Yes
14.  A  is responsible in  front of a third  party
licensed to make judgments about what
happens between B  and him/herself
Yes Yes Same situation Yes  Yes
15.  A  absolutely must have ongoing
surveillance (in real time) over B; without
this surveillance, the probability that B will
disobey is great
Yes Yes Same situation No No
A is the person who has  the power. B is the dependent person subjected to that power. For comparison, analysis of the foreman/worker relation: seven shares traits. For
comparison, analysis of the social worker/socially disadvantaged person relation: eight shares traits.
as they participated together as players in  a TV game show. Because
the filming was said to be for a pilot show aimed at testing the game
“under real conditions” and improving it if need be, they were
informed that they would not win any money, unlike the future
game contestants who would try together to  win a million euros.
In three conditions out of four, the players were also told that the
film would not be broadcasted on TV. For one of the players (“the
questioner”), the task consisted of asking questions; for the other
(“the contestant”), the task was to answer correctly. They were
told that  the penalty for each incorrect answer would be an  electric
shock delivered by the “questioner” to the “contestant”. The
alleged producer then had the subjects draw straws to determine
which person would play which role. The drawing was rigged so
that the experimental subject was always the questioner and the
Author's personal copy
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Table  2
Characteristics of the sample: gender, age, and reality-TV watching.
Caractéristiques de l’échantillon : sexe, âge et  consommation de télé-réalité.
Gender Total (n)
Male (n) Female (n)
Experimental population 40 36 76
18 of whom (23.7%)
were avid watchers of
reality TVa
Age group
25–29 8 6  14
3  of whom (21.4%)
were avid watchers of
reality TVa
30–34 7 5 12
3 of whom (25%) were
avid  watchers of reality
TVa
35–39 7 7  14
3  of whom (21.4%)
were avid watchers of
reality TVa
40–44 6 7  13
3  of whom (23%) were
avid  watchers of reality
TVa
45–49 6 6  12
3  of whom (25%) were
avid  watchers of reality
TVa
50–55 6 5  11
3  of whom (27%) were
avid  watchers of reality
TVa
Mean age (in years) 39.6 39.8 39.7
a At least four French reality-TV shows watched on a  regular basis.
accomplice was always the contestant. Once this information
was given, the producer asked the players if they still wanted to
participate in the pilot. No one refused.
After a make-up session, the  two players were led on stage
where they were awaited by  the game host  (a female weather
forecaster for a French national TV station), the audience, and a
warm-up comedian whose job was to organize the applause and
encouragements to continue the game. Then, in front of the camera,
the host explained the game as follows. The contestant would be
given a limited amount of time to learn a list of 27 pairs of related
words (e.g., cloudy-sky, tame-animal, etc.). Then the questioner
would say the first word in each pair and the  contestant would
have to find the related word among the four words proposed.
If  the contestant made a mistake, the questioner was to deliver
an electric shock, increasing the shock’s intensity each time. The
team of players would win if  they were able get through all 27
questions (whether or not the  answers were correct or incorrect
and penalized by an electric shock). Once these rules were stated,
the contestant was taken into a  chamber where he would not be
seen by  the questioner or the audience. In front of everyone, before
the door of the chamber was  closed, the contestant was strapped
to the chair in which he would receive the shocks, and shown the
buttons to press to choose the right answer. The questioner was
seated at a desk in the center of the  stage, under the projectors
and cameras, with his/her back to the audience and facing a giant
screen where the questions would be displayed in succession. The
questioner was shown the  handles to be used to deliver the (fake)
electric shocks to the contestant, with an increase of 20 volts for
each new wrong answer. The shocks ranged from 20 volts to 460
volts and were grouped together in sets labeled:
• Slight Shocks (20, 40, 60 volts);
Table 3
Socio-occupational characteristics of sample.
Catégories socioprofessionnelles de l’échantillon.
Social category: social class (occupation) n (%)
A: Upper middle class (higher managerial, administrative, or professional) 1  (1.3)
B:  Middle class (intermediate managerial, administrative, or professional) 12 (15.6)
C1:  Lower middle class (supervisory or clerical, junior managerial, administrative, or professional) 31 (40.2)
C2: Skilled working class (skilled manual workers) 24 (31.2)
D:  Working class (semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers) 5 (6.5)
E:  Persons at the lowest level of subsistence, state pensioners or  widows (no other wage earner), casual or lowest grade workers 3  (3.9)
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• Moderate Shocks (80, 100, 120);
• Strong Shocks (140, 160, 180);
• Very Strong Shocks (200, 220, 240);
• Intense Shocks (260, 280, 300);
• Extremely Intense Shocks (320, 340, 360);
• Danger: Severe Shocks (380, 400, 420);
• XXX (440, 460).
The music and spotlights were turned on, and the host
announced that the game could begin.
According to a predetermined schedule, the contestant
responded incorrectly 24 times out of 27. If the questioner began to
hesitate or refused to go on, the host intervened by giving at most
five prods to urge the players to continue. The first four prods were
worded in a Milgram-like fashion (“Go on with the questions”, “Go
on, don’t let yourself get upset”, “The rules say you must go on”, “Go
on, we are taking all responsibility for this”). Only the  fifth prod “You
can’t make him lose; what does the  audience think?” was  specific
to the television situation; the audience insisted that the game be
continued. As in Milgram, starting from when the shock reached 80
volts, the contestant’s pre-recorded reactions were heard: grunts
at first, then loud cries of pain accompanied by  refusal to continue,
then screams and pleas to stop the game. After 380 volts, the  con-
testant said he refused to go on. After 420 volts, nothing more could
be heard.
The game ended either when the questioner had asked all 27
questions (which involved two shocks of 460 volts) or when, in
spite of the host’s five prods, the questioner decided to stop. The
questioners were informed of the rigging upon leaving the stage.
Then, in a calm place, they were debriefed at length.
2.5. Post-experimental debriefing
The debriefings were done by a two-person team that was
always made up of a psychologist and a specialist in the communi-
cation sciences. Five areas were covered:
• demystification, which included the two accomplices (contestant
and producer). After the questioners had met  the contestant and
noticed that he was fine, they were asked to  rate their degree of
psychological stress as they played the game;
• attributions of responsibility. They rated the extent to which the
game producer, the host, the contestant, the audience, and the
questioner him/herself were responsible for what happened. The
questioner had to divide up 100 points of responsibility among
these five persons;
• verbalization of the questioner’s feelings, which consisted of
letting him/her speak freely without contesting any potential
rationalizations;
• statistics-based demonstration that obedience was  the most fre-
quent behavior and that the causal weight carried by  the situation
accounted for this behavior;
• information indicating that the experiment would be incorpo-
rated into a TV documentary aimed at opposing certain forms of
reality TV. The debriefings lasted between 1 and 2 hours.
2.6.  Measures of obedience
Like Milgram (1974), we used two obedience measures. One
was a binary measure: obedience vs. disobedience. Obedience
occurred when the questioner went all the way up to the strongest
shock (here, 460 volts); disobedience occurred when the questioner
refused to go that high. The second measure was a continuous
measure with several degrees of obedience ranging from “absolute
refusal” to “absolute obedience”. In this case, the criterion was the
number of shocks delivered. The theoretical range was  0 to 24 (at
most 24 shocks, one per incorrect answer). In our data, the observed
values ranged from 5 to 24.
3. Results
3.1. Results relating to obedience
First, we compared our  results on the  binary obedience crite-
rion (Table 4) to Milgram’s results in the  similar conditions. Our
standard condition (81% obedience) did not differ statistically from
Milgram’s voice-feedback condition (62.5%) (Chi2 (1) = 3.02, P =  .08;
Cramer’s V =  0.20). Likewise, the host-withdrawal condition (28%
obedience) did not differ from Milgram’s condition “experimenter
absence” (20.5%) (Chi2 (1) = 0.12, P = .73; Cramer’s V = 0.05).
Then we  compared our four experimental conditions to each
other, again, on  the binary obedience criterion. Only the  standard
condition and the  host-withdrawal condition differed significantly
(Yates Chi2 = 5.48, P <  .02; Cramer’s V  = 0.45). The standard, social-
support, and TV-broadcast conditions did not differ, given that
the last two conditions did not differ from the host-withdrawal
condition (all Chi2 were non-significant). Lastly, the standard,
social-support, and TV-broadcast conditions pooled did not differ
from the  host-withdrawal condition.
On the degree-of-obedience measure (number of shocks
delivered), one-way Anova and paired-contrast showed again that
only the standard condition differed significantly from the host-
withdrawal condition (F(1.72) = 5.62, P =  .02, d =  0.56). But this time,
the standard, social-support, and TV-broadcast conditions taken
together differed (M = 21.2) from the host-withdrawal condition
(M =  16.4, [F(1.72) =  4.75, P = .03,  d  = 0.51]). Thus, we can oppose the
condition that produced the most disobedience (host-withdrawal)
to the other three conditions, which mainly produced obedience.
The results indicated that the  men  and women were equally
obedient, which is consistent with many earlier observations
(Blass, 1999, 2000) including a recent reproduction of Milgram’s
experiment (Burger, 2009). There was also no difference between
persons from different socio-occupational categories, between the
older and younger subjects, or between the avid reality-TV watch-
ers and the others. This absence of differences was  found no matter
what measure was  used: the  binary obedience/disobedience
criterion or the degree of obedience (number of shocks
delivered).
3.2. Questioners’ attributions of responsibility
At the beginning of the debriefing, the questioner had to divide
up 100 points of responsibility among the  game producer, the host,
him/herself, the audience, and the contestant. As a  whole, pairwise
comparisons showed that only two  pairs did not differ significantly.
The first was the questioner (M =  29.17) and the producer (who
was assigned the greatest amount of responsibility: M = 39.76). The
second was  the audience (M = 7.487) and the contestant (who was
assigned the smallest amount of responsibility: 4.77) (Table 5). All
other pairs differenced significantly at P <  .05 (Table 6).
For the partial results concerning the  obedient vs. disobedient
subjects’ attributions of responsibility to  the producer vs. the ques-
tioner, the means indicated a  statistically significant interaction:
obedient subjects attributed more responsibility to the  producer
than to themselves, whereas disobedient subjects did just the oppo-
site (Table 7).
This interaction was  significant for the standard, TV-broadcast,
and social-support conditions taken together (F(1.63) = 5.08,
P < .03), three homogeneous conditions in the sense that they were
mostly obedience-generating.
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Table  4
Number of obedient questioners and mean number of shocks delivered in the four conditions.
Nombre de questionneurs obéissants et  nombre moyen de chocs électriques délivrés dans les  quatre conditions.
Condition Standard






(n =  7)
Number of questioners who  went all  the way
to  the end (obedient)
n =  26 (81%) n =  14 (74%) n =  13 (72%) n =  2  (28%)
Mean  number of shocks delivered (degree of
obedience)
M =  21.91
s  = 4.00
M =  20.63
s  = 6.00
M =  20.67
s  = 5.97
M =  16.43
s  = 5.80
M: mean; s: standard deviation; ():  percentage of obedient subjects in each condition.
Table 5
Attribution of responsibility by obedient and disobedient questioners to the producer, questioner him/herself, host, audience, and contestant.
Attribution de la responsabilité au  producteur, questionneur lui/elle-même, animatrice, public et candidat, effectuée par les questionneurs obéissants et  désobéissants.
Producer Questioner Host Audience Contestant
Obedient subjects M =  43.14  M =  25.20  M =  19.20  M = 7.52 M =  5.13
n  = 51 s =  34.45 s =  29.74  s =  22.12  s = 15.11  s = 10.82
Disobedient subjects M =  30.53  M = 40.05 M =  18.26  M = 7.37 M =  3.79
n  = 20 s =  31.31 s =  34.83  s =  16.38  s = 13.06  s =  8.06
All  subjects M =  39.76  M =  29.17  M =  18.95  M = 7.48 M =  4.77
n  = 71 s =  33.15 s =  31.63  s = 20.63  s = 14.98  s = 10.14
M: mean; s: standard deviation. The questioner had to assign responsibility by dividing up 100 points across five targets.
3.3. Additional results about questioner behavior
First, to our great surprise, the fifth prod, which was  specific
to the TV setting (appeal to the audience by the  host followed
by encouragement to continue from the public), did not have the
expected effect. Of the 16 questioners who heard the fifth prod,
in the three standard, social-support and TV-broadcast conditions,
only one yielded to  pressure from the audience. He went all the way
up to the highest voltage. The fifth prod turned out to be especially
necessary for the disobedient questioners. Most of the obedient
ones went to the very end after only two or three prods.
Second, recall that for Milgram, if certain subjects disobey, it is
less for moral reasons than to release tension. He noted a number of
other tension-reducing phenomena. Even though our experiment
was conducted 45 years after Milgram’s, and in a very different con-
text, we observed the same phenomena. To begin, the questioners
laughed in the moderate-shock range (70% of questioners laughed
openly at 80 volts, when the contestant first makes a complaint).
Then at  180 volts, another phenomenon appeared: cheating (17% of
the subjects), which consisted of using a  tone of voice that made the
right answer obvious to the contestant (mode at 220 volts). Lastly,
when the contestant screamed at  320 volts (70% of questioners
still in the game), they did what Milgram called “psychological
elimination of the contestant” consisting of ignoring the contestant
by talking to cover up his screams (mode at  340 volts).
3.4. Answers to post-experimental questionnaire (5 weeks after
the experiment)
Out of the 76 questionnaires sent out, 64 were returned. The
questions fell into four categories: a: reasons for congratulating
oneself for having participated; b: reasons for regretting having
Table 6
Comparison of means (F) of questioners’ attributions of responsibility (obedient and disobedient subjects pooled, n = 71, df =  70).











F =  2.34
(d  =  .37)
Host
M  = 18.95
F =  15.13***
(d  =  .93)
F =  4.16*
(d  =  .49)
Audience
M  = 7.48
F =  48.16***
(d  =  1.66)
F =  23.43***
(d  =  1.16)
F =  14.51***
(d  =  .91)
Contestant
M  = 4.77
F =  64.64***
(d  =  1.92)
F =  34.69***
(d  =  1.41)
F =  28.52***
(d  =  1.28)
F =  1.82
(d = .32)
M: mean; d: Cohen’s d; *P  < .05; ***P < .001.
Table 7
Attribution of responsibility to the producer and questioner by obedient and disobedient subjects in  the standard, TV-broadcast, and social support conditions pooled.
Attribution de responsabilité au producteur et  au questionneur, effectuée par les  sujets obéissants et  désobéissants, dans les  trois conditions regroupées : standard, passage à  la
télévision et support social.
Producer Questioner Simple effects (df)
Obedient M =  43.67
s =  33.78
M = 24.61
s = 29.91
F (1.51) = 5.38
P = .02 (d =  .65)
Disobedient M =  25.33




Simple effects (df) F(1.63) =  3.61
P =  .06 (d = .48)
F(1.63) =  4.45
P =  04 (d =  .53)
M: mean; s: standard deviation; P:  significance level; d: Cohen’s d.
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participated; c: perceptions of the research team; d: attractive-
ness and utility of  new studies. For a, b, and c, the response scale
ranged from 0 to 3. For d, the answer choices were “yes” and “no”
(Supplementary data):
a) reasons for congratulating oneself for having participated. There
were nine questions in this category (e.g. “I learned things about
myself”, “I learned more about the world of television”, “I learned
things about people”, etc.). Only one question obtained a mean
below the theoretical mean of 1.5:  “It was my  chance to be on TV”
(M = 0.84). The highest means were found for “It’s always inter-
esting to participate in a  psychology experiment” (M = 2.42) and
“We  must fight the deleterious effects of reality TV” (M =  2.59);
b) reasons for regretting having participated. This category
included eight questions (e.g. “It was too hard for me”, “I would
have rather been on a real reality TV show”, “People’s dark sides
should not be revealed like this”). None of the questions reached
the theoretical mean of 1.5. The highest mean was observed for
the reason “It’s too hard for the average person” (M =  1.2). The
lowest means were obtained for the questions “I still haven’t
recovered” (M = 0.29) and “I’m a little afraid of  my  co-workers’
reactions” (M = 0.47);
c) perceptions of the research team (researchers and debriefers).
Here, we listed eight traits, with a positive (e.g. warm)  or nega-
tive (e.g. in a hurry) connotation. The positive traits obtained
a mean between 2 and 3 (e.g. competent: M =  2.7; devoted:
M = 2.5). The negative-trait means were between 0 and 1.5 (e.g.
conceited: = 0.42; nervous: M = 0.9);
d) attractiveness and utility of new studies. This category included
six questions, most of which obtained positive responses. For
example, 89% of the  questioners answered “yes” to the ques-
tion “I would participate in a  new experiment if  the occasion
arose”; 94% answered “yes” to “The producers’ project justified
our having gone through this”.
4.  Discussion
In the present study, we advance that, in addition to the impact
that TV images have on viewers (Bryant and Oliver, 2009; Courbet
and Fourquet, 2003; Marchand, 2004), the hold that  television has
on people is such that, for persons on  the stage of a TV game show,
it represents an authority strong enough to make them commit
clearly immoral or dangerous acts. To  demonstrate this, we  trans-
posed Milgram’s famous experimental obedience paradigm to the
context of a TV game show with a live audience and no prizes.
As far as we know, this is the first time Milgram’s electric-shock
procedure has ever been carefully replicated in a  social field where
science was not the source of legitimacy for the  agent of authority4.
Here, it was the authority of the television that was  at stake. Note
that the credibility of the television environment we  created was
validated by the statistical equivalence of the results obtained in the
standard condition (no broadcasting) and the TV-broadcast con-
dition. In this game-show setting, where a host incarnating the
televisual authority was present, most people were obedient, i.e.,
they delivered electric shocks that were as strong and as frequent
as  the ones used by Milgram, whether they had been told that the
show would or would not be broadcasted. This is the first notable
result of this research.
4 A few researchers objected that  obedience to the authority figure in Milgram’s
situation was  not due solely to his legitimacy. They argued that  the authority was
also  rooted in the attribution of technical skillfulness for operating the device (Blass
and Schmitt, 2001; Morelli, 1983). Here, one cannot ascribe any observed obedience
to  some assumed skillfulness the host might have had for operating the electric-
shock device, since she  was  known as a  TV weather forecaster.
It seems, then, that even in highly different contexts, the deter-
mining factor is the physical proximity of a person invested with the
right to give orders (even if  only temporarily). The second notable
result of this research arises from the fact  that the only experi-
mental condition that triggered significantly more disobedience (to
extents like those found by Milgram) was the condition where the
agent of authority went off stage. Despite the  small sample size for
this experimental condition, its confirmation of one of Milgram’s
results adds to its merit.
We thus attributed obedience behaviors to the prescriptive
power delegated to the host position. However, two alternative
interpretations must be considered. The first alternative inter-
pretation involves the influence of the televisual environment:
the cameras, music, projectors, monitors, audience, technicians
running back and forth, cameramen filming, etc. These factors
all contributed to the authenticity of the televisual environment,
impressed subjects and contributed to their implication in the
show’s concept and its success. It is therefore legitimate to wonder
if the obedience was  a product of this influence. Two arguments
allow us to answer in the negative. First, though audience inter-
vention is a strong element in the  televisual environment, we found
that audience intervention (fifth prod) encouraging the questioner
to continue did not have the anticipated effect. The second argu-
ment stems from the condition where disobedience is  observed:
when the host leaves the  set. Though the host is absent, the televi-
sual environment remains unchanged (lights, projectors, cameras,
audience, etc.).
The second alterative interpretation involves the subjects’ com-
mitment to the  situation. Subjects went through various phases
beginning with their arrival in the studio. They met  the producer
who, after giving them information about the game and about their
role, asked them to decide whether or not they would like to pro-
ceed. They then spend some time with the make-up artist who
prepared them for the show. At this point, subjects can still leave.
They then had a first meeting with the host and the contestant.
The hosts asked them if everything was OK. The subjects answered
yes.  Subjects are  thus in a situation which is particularly binding,
a  situation which, up to this point, is governed by what is defined,
operationally, as  free choice. In theory, this combination primes
them for other freely chosen behaviors that follow the course of
action (Joule and Beauvois, 1998). We  must nevertheless elimi-
nate this second interpretation of obedience. When the subjects
arrive on the set,  the situation changes, effectively marking the
end of the  free-choice5.  They are  now in front of a host who  gives
them instructions, “Continue. Do not let yourself be influenced.  .  .”
These instructions are typical of power situations where the host
has received a delegation. It is no longer a matter of choosing or
deciding, but rather of obeying or disobeying the host. Even if  sub-
jects are  committed, when the host leaves, subjects may  disobey,
and this is in fact what they do most of the time. We are led to
conclude that our results are due to  the host’s position as a power
agent, comparable to Milgram’s researcher.
If the behavioral data obtained in this study was very sim-
ilar to Milgram’s, so was  the  attribution data collected during
the debriefing. Our questioners attributed a  large part of the
responsibility to themselves. Like Milgram, we  can suggest that
these attributions were rooted in a  retrospective interpretation of
what happened. When answering the responsibility question, the
questioners were no longer in the experimental situation, so  they
could rationalize their behavior. To  do so, they may  have looked
for explanations in the Zeitgeist and in today’s prevailing norms,
5 We are  not suggesting that the subjects are being deprived of basic freedom,
but the fact that they are  no  longer invited to decide operationally characterizes
commitment situations (Beauvois, 2005, 2011).
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which prompt us  to be held accountable for our acts (Beauvois
and Dubois, 1988; Dubois, 2009; Dubois and Beauvois, 2008).
Note, however, that unlike the disobedient subjects, the obedient
ones attributed less responsibility to themselves — in line with the
pattern of the agent state — than to the producer. This is consistent
with Milgram’s (1974) idea that the very fact of being an  agent
means accepting oneself as an executing agent for some other agent
of power, the latter of whom is the one held responsible for what
happens.
A striking thing here is that the condition where social support
for disobedience was provided by an  assistant who arrived on stage
and requested that the game be stopped because it  was becoming
dangerous did not produce disobedience. This troubling finding has
been observed recently by other researchers: conditions designed
to produce disobedience, and which produced disobedience under
Milgram’s experimental conditions, have ended up producing
mostly obedience. Burger (2009),  for example, found that the inter-
vention of an accomplice who refused to continue did not  generate
the expected disobedience. Could it be that the period we  are living
in predisposes people to greater obedience6? What we found here
in the television studio is that obedience continues to be a reality,
at a time when many authors believe that our  societies are  evolving
instead toward greater permissiveness, toward more “negotiated”
powers and even toward the end of authority altogether (Friedberg,
1997; Lemel and Galland, 1988). While this is not sufficient to make
the argument that current times encourage greater obedience than
was the case in the 1960s, our observations, like those of Burger,
warrant at least some skepticism about theses like that of the end
of authority. They also help us  understand why, in today’s liberal
society, “moral rebels” may  be stigmatized (Monin et al., 2008).
It has long been known that television, and so television hosts,
had influence on viewers. We  suspected they could also have pre-
scriptive power for ordering people’s behavior on a television stage,
including contrattitudinal, cruel and immoral behaviors. But it  had
never been shown. The present research demonstrates this aspect.
This sheer fact should put TV show producers and channels face
to face with their potential responsibility for possible deleterious
effects of reality TV games and shows.
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